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In March 2018, Xi Jinping, the President of the People’s Republic 
of China (“China” or “PRC”) and the General Secretary of the Chinese 
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and to the staff editors for their work on this Article. 
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Communist Party (“CCP” or “the Party”), was elevated to highest 
echelons of political power.1 Successfully consolidating power to an 
unprecedented level since Deng Xiaopeng and Mao Zedong, Xi is now 
the “core leader” of a centralized system geared towards implementing 
his vision for China’s future.2 “Xi Jinping Thought”3 is now enshrined 
in the CCP’s constitution, and was written into the PRC Constitution 
itself after a March 11, 2018 vote by China’s National People’s 
Congress. 4  At the same time, the national legislature voted 
overwhelmingly to amend the PRC Constitution to abolish term limits 
on the presidency.5 
Having brought ill-disciplined Party cadres to heel through his 
ambitious (and ruthless) anti-corruption campaign 6  Xi is now 
determined to re-establish Party authority over virtually every aspect 
of Chinese life, including the media, universities, schools, key cultural 
institutions, corporations, and the military, and even law firms—
reiterating at the 19th Party Congress that “the Party is the leader of 
 
1. Matt Schrader, In A Fortnight: Xi’s Other Amendments, JAMESTOWN F. (Mar. 12, 2018, 
6:00 AM), https://jamestown.org/program/xis-other-amendments/ (describing the twenty-one 
constitutional amendments proposed during the thirteenth National Party Congress in March 
2018 as “the largest rewriting of the PRC Constitution since its wholesale revision in 1982” and 
that the “proposed revisions . . . signal the extent to which Xi Jinping has consolidated power”). 
2. Shi Jiangtao, Congress concludes with President Xi Jinping as undisputed ‘core’ leader, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 25, 2017, 5:47 PM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/
policies-politics/article/2116830/congress-concludes-xi-undisputed-core-leader [https://perma
.cc/UT9E-NUGB].  
3. The full name of Xi Jinping’s ideological and policy agenda is “Xi Jinping Thought on 
Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a New Era.” The elevation of Xi Jinping’s theoretical 
contributions to the CCP’s constitution elevates him to the level of Deng Xiaoping and Mao 
Zedong. See Peter Wood, CCP Revises Constitution For a “New Era” (Nov. 10, 2017, 3:02 PM), 
JAMESTOWN F., https://jamestown.org/program/ccp-revises-constitution-new-era/ [https://
perma.cc/NF46-26MX] (analyzing Xi Jinping’s agenda). 
4. Lu Hui, China Focus: China’s national legislature adopts landmark constitutional 
amendment, XINHUA (Mar. 11, 2018, 11:19 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-
03/11/c_137032165.htm [https://perma.cc/6C38-6DGU]. 
5. Chris Buckley & Steven Lee Myers, China’s Legislature Blesses Xi’s Indefinite Rule. 
It was 2,958 to 2, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/11/world/
asia/china-xi-constitution-term-limits.html. 
6. See China anti-graft drive sees 100 top officials tried in five years, HONG KONG FREE 
PRESS (Mar. 10, 2018, 7:28 AM), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/03/10/china-anti-graft-
drive-sees-100-top-officials-tried-five-years/ [https://perma.cc/46D3-B93W]; Choi Chi-yuk, Xi 
Jinping’s anti-graft drive has caught so many officials that Beijing’s elite prison is running out 
of cells, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 21, 2018, 11:56 AM), http://www.scmp.com/
news/china/policies-politics/article/2133251/xi-jinpings-anti-graft-drive-has-caught-so-many 
[https://perma.cc/DQW3-EQWD]. 
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everything.”7 In March 2018, the National Party Congress announced 
plans for a “revolutionary” restructuring of Chinese government 
structures,8 one which is intended to reassert the Party’s leadership 
over all government agencies.9 Most pertinently, the Supreme People’s 
Court and Procuratorate will be subject to the newly created, powerful 
National Supervision Commission, 10  expanding the Party’s powers 
over China’s judiciary.11 
This centralization of power is driven by the desire for ideological 
control and the belief that such discipline is necessary for the 
legitimacy of the CCP’s continued rule in China.12 There is an intense 
crackdown—both within the government13 and across Chinese civil 
society—on those who challenge (or are perceived to challenge) Xi 
Jinping’s vision of a rejuvenated Chinese nation with the Party at its 
 
7. Nectar Gan, Xi Jinping Thought – the Communist Party’s tighter grip on China in 16 
characters, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 25, 2017) http://www.scmp.com/news/china/
policies-politics/article/2116836/xi-jinping-thought-communist-partys-tighter-grip-china 
[https://perma.cc/KWV3-WUGW] (quoting Xi Jinping’s speech at the 19th National Party 
Congress, in which he said, “Government, military, society and schools, north, south, east and 
west – the party leads them all.”). 
8. China’s reform of Party, state institutions revolutionary: senior official, XINHUA (Mar. 
13, 2018, 4:23 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/13/c_137036286.htm 
[https://perma.cc/M5QS-NWYG]. 
9. Id. (paraphrasing Liu He, a top official, who noted that “[a] primary task of deepening 
reform of the Party and state institutions is to strengthen the CPC’s leadership in every sector”). 
10. Josephine Ma, Revealed: the far-reaching powers of China’s new super anticorruption 
agency, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 13, 2018, 11:46 AM), http://www.scmp.com/
news/china/policies-politics/article/2136949/far-reaching-powers-chinas-new-super-anti-
corruption [https://perma.cc/Y3K7-36V3]. 
11.  See Mercy A. Kuo, China’s Detention Law: CCP Curbs Courts, THE DIPLOMAT (Feb. 
21, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/chinas-detention-law-ccp-curbs-courts/ [https://
perma.cc/5UHD-Y6PU] (analyzing in detail the possible impacts of the National Supervision 
Law, especially regarding the extension of extralegal detentions and the limits of criminal 
procedure protections for suspects). 
12. See Jun Mai, Xi Jinping is changing the constitution, but what’s his endgame? SOUTH 
CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 11, 2018), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/
article/2136676/xi-jinping-changing-constitution-whats-his-endgame? [https://perma.cc/67X4-
B5MM]. 
13. Aside from the wide-ranging anti-corruption investigations that have cowed other 
officials, experts also point to the marginalization of rival political factions within the Party 
structure, the demotions of those who “do not see eye to eye with Xi” and heightened scrutiny 
of business interests of those deemed insufficiently loyal. See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Xi Jinping 
Steers China back to the Days of Mao Zedong, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION (Mar. 5, 2018, 1:58 
PM), https://jamestown.org/program/xi-jinping-steers-china-back-days-mao-zedong/ [https://
perma.cc/T5WW-M759] (arguing that personnel changes demonstrate “[t]hat Xi is determined 
to run China in his own mold—and to banish all voices of opposition”). 
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core and himself at its helm.14 In practice, this aggressive assertion of 
power over Chinese society is being pushed not only through the use 
of laws and regulations to govern behavior,15 but also at the level of 
values promotion and the intentional shaping of historical and cultural 
narratives – that is, winning hearts and minds. 
It is not a coincidence that human rights lawyers and NGO 
activists working on rights issues are the hardest hit in the broad 
crackdown against Chinese civil society. 16  This Article argues that 
fundamentally this is a sharp attack to deny the political and civic space 
needed for the contestation of ideas, and to suppress those that dare to 
reveal human rights abuses – that is, those that reveal “negative stories” 
about China that challenge the positive image that the government is 
seeking to project. Nor is it a coincidence that Xi’s vision of global 
governance under Chinese leadership involves pushing the concept of 
“a people-centered development philosophy” as an alternative model 
to the international human rights legal system underpinned by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.17 This Article argues that such 
moves are a serious attempt to move the battlegrounds for rights 
lawyering and rights promotion away from the legal system and the 
policy-making arena, into the sphere of public opinion, which can be 
 
14. See discussion infra Part I, III. 
15. See discussion of laws and regulations infra Part III. 
16.  More than 300 lawyers and activists were affected by a nationwide crackdown on July 
9, 2015; by mid-2018, most of the so-called “709” lawyers and activists who were indicted have 
been sentenced, with one final lawyer, Wang Quanzhang, awaiting his trial almost three years 
after being disappeared. China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, “709 Crackdown: Latest 
Data and Development of Cases as of 1800 17 May 2018,” http://www.chrlawyers.hk/en/
content/%E3%80%90%E2%80%9C709-crackdown%E2%80%9D%E3%80%91-latest-data-
and-development-cases-1800-17-may-2018 [https://perma.cc/9GN2-UJRU]. After almost two 
years of secret detention, Wu Gan, who did not admit wrongdoing, was sentenced to eight years 
on charges of subversion; and Xie Yang, who pleaded guilty to subversion charges in May 2017, 
was retried but escaped a prison sentence despite his “explosive account of being tortured, beaten 
and threatened by interrogators.” See Benjamin Haas, Chinese human rights activist jailed eight 
years for subversion, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 25, 2017, 11:37 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/26/chinese-human-rights-lawyer-jailed-for-
eight-years-for-subversion [https://perma.cc/563D-FFUV]. See also China human rights lawyer 
Xie Yang ‘admits being brainwashed,’ BBC NEWS, (May 8, 2017) 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-39843680 [https://perma.cc/3FNN-VA9T] 
(explaining how the “709 crackdown” got its name).  
17. See Full text of Chinese President Xi Jinping's congratulatory message to South-South 
Human Rights Forum, XINHUA (Dec. 7, 2017, 4:40 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/
english/2017-12/07/c_136808493.htm [https://perma.cc/EQ9W-LK2U]; see also Charlotte 
Gao, China Promotes Human Rights ‘With Chinese Characteristics,’ THE DIPLOMAT (Dec. 12, 
2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/china-promotes-human-rights-with-chinese-
characteristics/ [https://perma.cc/62PR-4VKW]. 
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more comprehensively managed by a well-oiled media management 
infrastructure and increasingly strict media censorship laws. 
This Article will examine the broader legal, regulatory and social 
context within which rights lawyering in China occurs, especially as it 
affects the political and civic space within which values are promoted 
and narratives are shaped. It begins by contextualizing the emergence 
of rights lawyering in the early 2000s, looking at several factors that 
supported the mobilization of lawyers and other activists advocating 
for different kinds of human rights through the Chinese legal system. 
It then turns to recent trends in the political and legal frameworks that 
influence the space for rights lawyering, starting with an analysis of 
Xi’s vision for a new era in China’s history, and the shift from winning 
within the courts to shaping the narrative in the public opinion sphere. 
Finally, this Article examines the possible impact of these shifts on the 
rights lawyering and grassroots mobilization in the areas of LGBTQ 
rights and women’s rights. 
II. RIGHTS LAWYERING AND LEGAL MOBILIZATION IN 
CONTEXT 
Scholarship about lawyers as a profession in China, civil society 
activism and grassroots mobilization has flourished even as the 
political environment for the subjects of such scholarship is rapidly 
changing. Experts have studied Chinese lawyers’ work methodologies, 
their daily experiences in courts, scrutinized constitutional litigation 
cases, and analyzed how Chinese lawyers and law firms are regulated.18 
A body of scholarship around what I would collectively call “rights 
lawyering” is also developing, with several seminal works in recent 
years that look closely at the motivations and experiences of different 
groups of lawyers. Scholars have adopted different taxonomies of the 
legal profession19 and examined several institutional and social factors 
 
18. See Terence C. Halliday & Sida Liu, Birth of a Liberal Moment? Looking through a 
OneWay Mirror at Lawyers’ Defense of Criminal Defendants in China in FIGHTING FOR 
POLITICAL FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 65-107 (Terence C. Halliday et al. eds., 2007) (discussing the use of Article 306 of 
the 1997 PRC Criminal Law to detain, prosecute or convict lawyers under the crime of “lawyer’s 
perjury” and its retaliatory use in practice against defense lawyers). 
19. See, e.g., EVA PILS, CHINA’S HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS: ADVOCACY AND 
RESISTANCE (2014) (analyzing the experiences of human rights lawyers in Chinese law and 
politics); SIDA LIU & TERENCE HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA: THE POLITICS OF 
LAWYERS AT WORK 6-7 (2016) (analyzing criminal defense lawyers in China and their methods 
of working). Liu and Halliday present a taxonomy of lawyers including: progressive elites, 
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for the emergence of lawyers and other rights advocates who are 
“willing[] and ab[le] . . . to stand out, speak out, and act out in 
addressing public policy issues through litigation.”20 These taxonomies 
are not mutually exclusive, because they seek to categorize the 
evolving motivations, conduct, cases, strategies of lawyers who 
interact with, influence, and are influenced by, their peers and their 
external environment. Moreover, while some lawyers may proactively 
identify themselves with certain groups of lawyers (i.e. human rights 
lawyers, 21  weiquan [ 维 权  rights-protection or rights defense] 
lawyers,22 “die-hard” lawyers,23 or public interest lawyers) as a means 
of establishing their own networks, others adopt similar approaches or 
share similar ideals but eschew labels to mitigate risk. While a full 
analysis of these different categories (both ascribed and self-perceived) 
is beyond the scope of this Article, I use “rights lawyering” to 
encompass a wide range of lawyering activities with several shared 
characteristics. First, it involves legal advocacy focusing on interests 
that are broader than those of an individual case or the interests of an 
 
pragmatic brokers, political activists, and routine practitioners. For Chinese criminal defense 
lawyers, they further differentiate the category of political activists into two types: notable 
activists (referring to a small group of lawyers that “proactively seek out politically sensitive 
cases and challenge arbitrary state power”) and grassroots activists (referring to “ordinary 
lawyers all over China who possess politically liberal values and motivations but do not mobilize 
collectively due to unfavorable structural constraints . . . [but] use their everyday . . . work to 
pursue substantive legal-political goals of protecting the basic legal rights of citizens through 
practices of proceduralism”). Id. at 6-7. 
20. See Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, The Development of Public Interest Litigation in 
China, in PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN ASIA 1 (Po Jen Yap et al. eds., Routledge 2010) 
(defining public interest lawyering). 
21. Note that the terms used by scholars to label Chinese lawyers can be different from 
how they perceived or organized themselves. For example, Eva Pils uses “human rights lawyer” 
and “rights lawyer” interchangeably, although her work primarily focused on weiquan lawyers. 
See Bochen Han, China’s Human Rights Lawyers: Political Resistance and the Law, THE 
DIPLOMAT (Feb. 11, 2016), https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/chinas-human-rights-lawyers-
political-resistance-and-the-law/ [https://perma.cc/L3M3-B5J2]. 
22. See generally Hualing Fu & Richard Cullen, Weiquan (Rights Protection) Lawyering 
in an Authoritarian State: Building a Culture of Public-Interest Lawyering, 59 THE CHINA J. 
111, 111-127, (2008) (offering a basic taxonomy classifying weiquan lawyering as moderate, 
critical and radical based on tactics and perceptions of the use of law); Teng Biao, Rights 
Defence (weiquan), Microblogs (weibo), and the Surrounding Gaze (weiguan), 2012/3 CHINA 
PERSP. 29, 29-41 (2012) (discussing the rights defense movement [维权运动 weiquan 
yundong]). 
23. Lawyers who identify as being part of the “diehard faction” (死磕 派 sikepai) take 
their name from a northern slang term roughly translated “to fight to the bitter end.” See Alexa 
Olesen, Meet China’s Swaggering, ‘Diehard’ Criminal Lawyers, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 16, 
2014, 6:30 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/16/meet-chinas-swaggering-diehard-
criminal-lawyers/ [https://perma.cc/6TBN-G5RP]. 
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immediate client. 24  Second, it involves the use of legal tools—and 
sometimes non-legal tools—to push for reforms of the existing Chinese 
legal and policy framework to improve the protection and promotion 
of individuals’ rights, especially those from marginalized 
communities.25 
Several important factors contributed to the emergence of rights 
lawyering and the ability of lawyers of different stripes to mobilize. 
One important structural factor is the rapid proliferation of laws and 
regulations in the rebuilding of China’s legal system from 1978 
onwards and the accompanying professionalization of lawyers.26 The 
1996 PRC Lawyers Law27 officially marked the privatization of the 
legal profession, moving away from lawyers being state legal workers 
to lawyers with professional identity and ethics.28 One consequence of 
the building of the Chinese socialist legal system29 is that “law has 
become an important aspect of state ideology and of popular 
consciousness.” 30  The enshrinement of “rule of law” and “human 
rights” in the 2004 amendment of the PRC Constitution further 
entrenched these concepts in popular discourse,31 and provided space 
for rights defense activists. 32  Rule of law discourse also offered 
opportunities for cross-cultural exchange of ideas about the role of law 
within a society, including the role of China’s constitution and ideas 
related to individual civil rights.33 
 
24. See Fu & Cullen, supra note 22, at 111-12. 
25. See Rachel E. Stern, Activist Lawyers in Post-Tiananmen China, 42 Law & Soc. Inq. 
234-51 (2017), 237-40 (discussing the traditions that what she calls activist lawyers point to as 
motivational factors for their push for reforms).  
26. Jerome Cohen, Keynote: An Introduction to Law in China, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 393, 399 
(2007) (“I don’t know of another national elite in history that has done more to produce 
legislation, regulations, guidance and other norms in so short a time.”) 
27. Law of the People’s Republic of China on Lawyers (adopted by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., May 15, 1996, effective Jan. 1, 1997).  
28. See Fu & Cullen, supra note 22, at 124. 
29 . See generally Establishment of the Socialist System of Laws with Chinese 
Characteristics, CHINA INTERNET INFORMATION CENTER. http://www.china.org.cn/
government/whitepaper/2011-10/27/content_23738846.htm [https://perma.cc/RT5Y-EV2G] 
(providing an authoritative explanation of the government’s position on the historical context of 
the development of the contemporary Chinese legal system). 
30. Benjamin L. Liebman, Assessing China’s Legal Reforms, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 17, 
19 (2009). 
31. See Fu & Cullen , supra note 22, at 123. 
32 . See Teng, supra note 22, at 30 (“Rule of law discourse coupled with laws and 
regulations provided space for rights defence activists.”) 
33. Id.  
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Similarly, this process opened up political space for 
entrepreneurship in governance and legal reforms, allowing lawyers to 
play a role in demonstrating gaps in the legal framework and suggest 
possibility of reform. Liu and Halliday note that “lawyers who strive 
for basic legal freedoms often insist that this is only possible if state 
power itself is fractured, most importantly through some independence 
or autonomy of the judiciary, from control by the monarchy, the 
military, one-party leaders, or an executive branch of government, 
including the police—the domestic coercive arm of government 
itself.”34 Moreover, the proliferation of new laws also generated more 
instances where the differences in the law in text and the law in practice 
created opportunities for lawyers and their clients to hold government 
officials accountable to legal rhetoric.35 Experimentation was seen as 
facilitative of state interests in legal reform, not just in the promulgation 
of new laws at the local levels, but also in the “willingness of courts 
and local governments to take actions that at times contradict national 
rules or laws.”36 Therein lies opportunities for lawyers to bring new 
ideas to courts or legislators in order to expand or concretize certain 
rights. 
The Reform Era also saw vibrant civil society growth, with 
“[s]pace for civil activity enlarged by development of the market 
economy.” 37  Civil society activism helped to increase the “rights 
awareness of aggrieved individuals and their readiness to assert their 
rights,”38 broadening the pool of plaintiffs for lawyers, while lawyers’ 
engagement with NGOs working with marginalized communities also 
supported mutually beneficial relationships and increased innovation 
in how to engage with the state.39 Another aspect of this was the space 
within the legal academy for law professors and lawyers to shape public 
discourse about law; as Fu and Cullen note: “Academic lawyers have 
 
34. LIU & HALLIDAY, supra note 19, at 4. 
35. Fu and Cullen note that “inconsistency between legal rights and their routine violation 
in practice creates opportunities in the political and legal system for weiquan to develop.” Fu & 
Cullen, supra note 22, at 123 (citing KEVIN J. O’BRIEN & LIANJIANG LI, RIGHTFUL RESISTANCE 
IN RURAL CHINA (2006)). 
36. Liebman, supra note 30, at 21. 
37. Teng, supra note 22, at 30. 
38. Fu & Cullen, supra note 22, at 125. 
39. Id. at 124. 
2018] RIGHTS LAWYERING IN XI'S CHINA 1119 
been crucial in promoting the concept of the constitutional and legal 
protections of rights.”40 
A relatively open media landscape, including through internet 
news platforms, was also a contributing factor. With journalists and 
editors who are willing and able to write and publish on social justice 
issues, and legal news increasing in popularity,41 lawyers were able to 
use media attention as a way to influence public opinion on a particular 
case or a particular topic—and perhaps even encourage government 
intervention in favor of their clients or their clients’ communities.42 
Technological advancements, especially on social media 
platforms, allow for greater ease of communications across China and, 
with it, the spread of legal knowledge.43 The exponential growth in 
Internet users and the use of mobile technology in China also increased 
the ability of lawyers to organize themselves—to build connections 
with other like-minded lawyers outside the bounds of geography, to 
discuss cases and legal strategies, and to broadcast their opinions44—
both in furtherance of cases and for community mobilization should an 
activist/lawyer face threats. Social media is particularly important for 
activist lawyers, as it offers a platform for lawyers to take their opinions 
and legal arguments to the general public, therefore bypassing 
traditional media outlets (newspapers or television reporting) that is 
heavily regulated.45 
Scholars often use political positioning to describe lawyers’ 
motivations, decision-making and conduct—that is, differentiating 
 
40. Fu & Cullen, supra note 22, at 113-14 (noting that law schools were particularly 
supportive practice sites for weiquan lawyering and noting leading weiquan lawyers that were 
professors whose “university position allows them the freedom, financial and otherwise, to play 
an active role in weiquan lawyering,” including He Weifang, Xu Zhiyong, Teng Biao and Fan 
Yafeng from the Law Institute, China Academy of Social Sciences, Zhou Wei from Sichuan 
University). 
41 . LIU & HALLIDAY, supra note 19 at 71 (describing a “notable trend of 
commercialization in the Chinese media . . . legal news, as well as other social news, has become 
a popular section for many newspapers and TV programs.”) 
42. Id. at 72. 
43. See Liebman, supra note 30, at 21 (“The actions of procurators, lawyers, and ordinary 
citizens are also influenced by knowledge of legal developments elsewhere in China.”) 
44. See, e.g., LIU & HALLIDAY, supra note 19, at 74 (“For highly sensitive cases . . . on 
which no official Chinese media would report, some notable activists in Beijing sometimes use 
Internet blogs and microblogs or go directly to the international media . . . WeChat groups, 
which are more private than blogs and microblogs, have also become a popular tool for activist 
lawyers to provide support for like-minded colleagues in recent years.”) 
45. See id. at 75, 87 (“Whenever there is an influential legal case, they speak collectively 
through the Internet using social media to voice their opinions to the public sphere.”) 
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between those who adopt “moderate” political stances (i.e. not openly 
critical of the Chinese government), and those more “radical” lawyers 
willing to challenge the government and take on cases that other 
lawyers may consider to be “off limits because they are . . . political 
questions that are too important and sensitive for the law to decide.”46 
These political calculations—and the ability to mitigate risks—are 
extremely important to lawyers’ ability to win their cases, continue 
their rights advocacy, and mobilize support without facing government 
reprisal, especially because the personal costs of being attacked by the 
government are extremely high.47 
Yet what happens when the lines of what is, and what is not, 
political shifts? 
III. THE RESHAPING OF RIGHTS AND LAW IN XI’S CHINA 
Under the Xi administration, previous calculations of political 
acceptability and risks shifted dramatically, while methods of 
government repression are changing. While repression of civil society 
activism and rights lawyering was always part of the landscape under 
the Hu Jintao administration, Xi’s rise has “ushered in a campaign of 
repression against civil society characterized by national security 
rhetoric, the criminalization of threatening activism, and proactive 
repression.”48 Xi continues to preside over the most wide-ranging and 
sustained attack on civil society that China has seen since the 
Tiananmen Square crackdown in June 1989 as the state “aggressively 
police[s] boundary pushers.” 49 Rights-based NGOs suffered intense 
harassment, some forced to close their doors altogether, others to 
tamper down their activities or to continue to work underground.50 
 
46.  Fu & Cullen, supra note 20, at 2 (“Radical lawyers are willing to take on politically 
sensitive cases, which the government regards as off limits, ready to mobilize media and NGOs, 
and prepared to work with foreign entities.”) 
47. See Liu & Halliday supra note 19, at 90 (“Since the zealous advocacy of activist 
lawyers can readily be construed as acts of political subversion, the defenders of the Party-state 
deploy an array of weapons in their armories to silence, quash, domesticate, marginalize, isolate, 
or exile these stubborn defenders of the weak. The personal costs of rights advocacy and defense 
have been widely reported in the media and analyzed by scholars . . . namely, professional 
sanctions, state security repression, and violence of the black mafia.”) 
48. Diana Fu & Greg Distelhorst, Grassroots Participation and Repression under Hu 
Jintao and Xi Jinping, 79 THE CHINA J. 100, 104 (2018). 
49. Id. at 100. 
50.  See generally Chinese Human Rights Defenders, Repression & Resilience: Annual 
Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (Feb. 2018) (presenting a full 
accounting of government actions against human rights activists in 2017). 
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Activists have been detained in record numbers: a large-scale, 
coordinated attack on human rights lawyers and activists starting on 
July 9, 2015 (now known as the “709” crackdown) targeted more than 
300 rights lawyers and activists across the country.51 
A. Xi’s China: Personalization of Power and Impact on Civil 
Society 
The personalization of power under Xi Jinping has not only 
changed the structure of the Chinese government, it has also 
significantly curtailed the space for diverse ideas and discourse. Xi 
Jinping “has made himself the chairman of everything”52 and injected 
party control into areas that were relatively independent for the last two 
decades. For example, the reintroduction of party cells into many 
different sectors – including private companies, schools at all levels53 
and even law firms—is intended to ensure that discipline and 
monitoring is done from the inside. Moreover, the merger of party and 
state institutions54 seeks to close structural gaps between central and 
local governments so that central Party prerogatives and state 
governance are more aligned.55 This will likely reduce the space for 
rights lawyers to exploit opportunities that derive from the “de facto 
pluralistic nature of today’s OPS [one party state].”56 
There is also increased control of different actors who offer 
alternative poles of influence, in part to institute ideological control and 
to ensure that the Party leads reform efforts and shapes narratives about 
contemporary and historical events. It is well-documented that 
universities are under tight political control, and that professors—once 
seen to be relatively insulated from political reprisal because of social 
 
51. Alex W. Palmer, ‘Flee at Once’: China’s Besieged Human Rights Lawyers, THE N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (July 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/magazine/the-lonely-
crusade-of-chinas-human-rights-lawyers.html. 
52. Xi Jinping decides to abolish presidential term limits, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 1, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/news/china/21737543-unhappiness-china-palpable-xi-jinping-
decides-abolish-presidential-term-limits [https://perma.cc/92ZX-RPLQ].  
53. See Gan, supra note 7. 
54. Xi Jinping decides to abolish presidential term limits, supra note 52 (discussing 
constitutional revisions that highlight the leading role of the Chinese Communist Party in the 
government, noting that “[p]arty and state could hardly become more amalgamated”). 
55. Tian Feliong, Beyond term limits: China’s new constitution is written for a nation on 
the rise, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 23, 2018, 3:58 PM), 
http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2138542/beyond-term-limits-chinas-
new-constitution-written-nation [https://perma.cc/JA5V-R9WS].  
56. Fu & Cullen, supra note 22, at 126. 
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prestige and vestiges of academic freedom—are subject to restrictions 
on expressing their views and what they can teach in class.57 Media 
outlets, once a source of influence in public affairs, have been 
drastically curtailed and the ranks of journalists diminished as well.58 
As for the non-governmental and charities sector, the Charity Law and 
the Foreign NGO Management Law have, in effect, combined to 
channel resources towards sectors that are officially sanctioned and 
away from rights-based advocacy.59 
B. Role of Law and Lawyers in Xi’s China 
Although rights lawyers often emphasize law as a tool of reform, 
law can also be a tool of oppression and repression. In recent years, the 
high-octane push for law-making to improve the socialist legal system 
with Chinese characteristics60 also included a dragnet of laws aimed at 
preventing social disruption, regulating behavior and punishing those 
who challenge government prerogative. 61  The March 2018 
constitutional amendments have added a new phrase “socialist rule by 
law” to the CCP’s governing philosophy—moving away from “rule of 
law” language to “rule by law” also dispenses with the veneer of 
judicial independence, and marking a return to the Marxist/Leninist 
view that “courts should be a tool of party control.”62 This is also 
 
57. Anthony Kuhn, In China, Scholars Are Being Punished Amid Growing Squeeze On 
Public Expression, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 10, 2017, 11:24 AM), https://www.npr.org/
sections/parallels/2017/10/10/553484924/in-china-scholars-are-being-punished-amid-growing-
squeeze-on-public-expression [https://perma.cc/CB2U-W5NL]. 
58. Liz Tung, “Social media fills vacuum left by China’s ‘hollowed out’ press,” Columbia 
Journalism Review (May 25, 2017) https://www.cjr.org/analysis/china-social-media-press-
freedom.php [https://perma.cc/7ZTV-UET4]. 
59 . Nuala Gathercole Lam, NGOs at a Crossroads, CHINA FILE (Feb. 5, 2018), 
http://www.chinafile.com/ngo/latest/ngos-crossroads [https://perma.cc/VKL8-UPFC] (noting 
“the current administration’s ‘re-centering’ of civil society around public service provision and 
away from advocacy” and that the Chinese government “is walking a narrow path—
maneuvering public services into the hands of civil society organizations, while simultaneously 
attempting to ensure they are not politicized by the situations their work brings them into contact 
with”). 
60. See Full Text: New Progress in the Legal Protection of Human Rights in China 2017, 
XINHUA (Dec. 15, 2017, 5:18 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-
12/15/c_136828822.htm [https://perma.cc/R7D3-UKXD]. 
61.  Gan, supra note 7 (describing Xi’s governing philosophy as promoting confidence, 
noting that “[s]uch confidence comes with a lower tolerance for different views. In his first term, 
he sought to crush dissent, or what he calls ‘erroneous viewpoints,’ with a sweeping crackdown 
on activists, rights lawyers and civil society as well as stringent censorship of the media and the 
internet”). 
62.  Xi Jinping decides to abolish presidential term limits, supra note 52. 
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particularly true, given the National Supervision Law, which brings the 
courts under the Party’s supervision. The law’s jurisdiction now 
includes all civil servants, regardless of party membership, therefore 
extending investigative procedures of the Party and unlimited detention 
procedures to millions non-Party members.63 
New regulations intended to manage lawyers64 and law firms65 
now require lawyers to “support the leadership” of the CCP and to 
establish party branches in law firms. These regulations also seek to 
control lawyers’ opinions, prohibiting them from speech that 
challenges China’s political system or endangers national security. As 
noted by Human Rights Watch, 
 
The amended directives also impose vague and overbroad 
restrictions on all lawyers’ right to freedom of expression. 
Lawyers will now be prohibited from “inciting” or “organizing” 
their clients and others to participate in sit-ins or demonstrations 
that “disturb public order” or otherwise put pressure on the 
authorities, even if those gatherings are peaceful. Lawyers may not 
make “misleading” or “malicious” comments about any cases, 
publish or sign joint letters, or gather “virtually” or in person to 
“attack or slander” the judicial system. Lawyers are barred from 
“gathering crowds to make a fuss,” insulting judicial officers, 
“denying the nature of cults when the state has already determined 
them as such,” or other behaviors that “disturb court order.” They 
also cannot use the Internet and the media to “provoke discontent 
against the Party and the state” or “instigate” people to file lawsuits 
to “destabilize social stability.”66 
 
63. China detention law to roll back legal protections for suspects, THE FIN. TIMES, 
HTTPS://WWW.FT.COM/CONTENT/147EC1CA-0A38-11E8-8EB7-42F857EA9F09 [https://perma.
cc/W7ZV-ZBSW] (“The incursion of party authority into the civil state is a reversal of broader 
reforms undertaken since the 1979s to carve out a sphere for professional civil government in 
China.”) 
64. Lawyers Practice Management Methods (promulgated by the Ministry of Justice, Sept. 
18, 2016, effective Nov. 1, 2016) (China), http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2016/content_
5113014.htm [https://perma.cc/V75A-FXQC]. 
65. Id. 
66. See China: New Rules Gag Lawyers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 25, 2016, 7:55 PM), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/25/china-new-rules-gag-lawyers [https://perma.cc/B6TX-
NKX9].  
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C. Rights Discourse in Xi’s China 
There is also a significant shift in Chinese governmental attitudes 
towards international engagement, and particularly towards state 
rhetoric about international ideas and values. Authorities are seeking to 
combat undesirable ideological trends through limiting the influence of 
so-called “Western ideas” (including universal values like human 
rights, civil society and “the West’s view of media”67) and increasing 
control of how Chinese civil society actors engage with international 
partners. The CCP has increased its rhetoric naming “foreign forces” 
as major threats to China’s domestic stability, while accusing foreign 
powers of attempts to undermine China’s rise.68 It has branded those 
who dare to question the CCP’s agenda as agents of foreign powers and 
expanded legal definitions of “hostile groups” to include any group that 
challenges the power of the CCP, China’s socialist system or the 
Chinese government.69 For example, in 2017, the Chinese government 
broadened the Counter-Espionage Law to include conduct deemed 
subversive or threatening to national security like the issuing of 
information that harms China’s national security, or meeting with 
individuals that harm national security 70 —activities which are not 
traditionally deemed to be espionage. The Chinese government has also 
made disrespect to state symbols (like the national flag and anthem) or 
CCP heroes and leadership punishable offences.71 
 
67. See Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation, CHINAFILE (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.
chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation [https://perma.cc/53HE-6A4B] (Document 9 is 
an internal CCP communique listing seven taboo subjects that posed political “perils,” declaring 
that the promotion of civil society was being used as a “political tool” to “dismantle the ruling 
party’s social foundation.”) 
68. See Julia Makinen, China’s crackdown on dissent is described as the harshest in 
decades, THE L.A. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-
china-crackdown-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/8TBT-Z533]; Zheping Huang, The 
complete guide to China’s propaganda videos blaming the West for almost everything, QUARTZ 
(Aug. 8, 2016), https://qz.com/751338/the-complete-guide-to-chinas-propaganda-videos-
blaming-the-west-for-almost-everything/ [https://perma.cc/XK8C-C6ER].  
69 . See Nectar Gan, Beijing extends powers of state security agents under counter-
espionage law, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 7, 2017, 12:19 AM), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2123210/beijing-extends-powers-
state-security-agents-under. 
70. Counter-espionage rules stipulate exit, entry restrictions, XINHUANET.COM, (Dec. 6, 
2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-12/06/c_136805751.htm. 
71. For detailed discussion of the amendments to the Criminal Code and the establishment 
of the National Anthem Law, see Wendy Zeldin, China/Hong Kong/Macau: Penalization of 
Disrespect for National Anthem Under Tenth Criminal Code Amendment, Library oc Congress 
Global Legal Monitor, (Nov. 8, 2017), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/chinahong-
kongmacau-penalization-of-disrespect-for-national-anthem-under-tenth-criminal-code-
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At the same time, state-sponsored propaganda campaigns aimed 
at bolstering Chinese government and CCP-authorized narratives have 
been launched—looking not only at shaping narratives about Chinese 
culture and history, but also contemporary events. Since 2015, the 
Chinese authorities have launched an unprecedented campaign to shape 
public opinion against human rights activists—and consequently, 
human rights ideas—through the state-run media.72 National television 
outlets and state-run newspapers, which used to censor all references 
of human rights lawyers, have launched a coordinated smear campaign 
seeking to undermine and discredit the work of human rights lawyers 
and activists. Human rights lawyers are now painted as radical and 
working as an “organized criminal gang.” 73  Working with 
disenfranchised populations (including petitioners, many of whom are 
citizen activists) is now cast as subversive;74 while the use of social 
media to call attention to cases of injustice is used as evidence of 
sinister intent.75 In a troubling development, there has been an increase 
in the use of (coerced) confessions, 76 either televised on CCTV or 
disseminated via social media, as a way of assigning guilt without 
trial. 77  Moreover, this propaganda campaign also coopted Chinese 
media through the use of televised interviews or interviews with the 
 
amendment/ [https://perma.cc/E9PH-PG49]. For analysis of the newly enacted Heroes and 
Martyrs Protection Act, see China Digital Times, New Law Criminalizes slander of Historical 
Heroes, (Apr. 28, 2018), https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2018/04/new-law-criminalizes-slander-
of-historical-heroes/. 
72. See generally Safeguard Defenders, Scripted and Staged: Behind the scenes of China’s 
forced TV confessions (2018) (containing extensive analysis and detailed descriptions of the 
experiences of human rights activists and the use of state-run media to promote this narrative).  
73.  Tom Phillips, The Case of Wang Yu, emblem of China’s human rights crackdown, 
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 2, 2015, 4:08 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/
the-case-of-wang-yu-emblem-of-chinas-human-rights-crackdown [https://perma.cc/TEY4-
AZ5E]. 
74. See Chris Buckley, Chinese Authorities Detain and Denounce Rights Lawyers, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 11, 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/12/world/asia/china-arrests-human-
rights-lawyers-zhou-shifeng.html. 
75 . Sarah Cook, How China’s Crackdown on Lawyers Affects Media Freedom, THE 
DIPLOMAT, Aug. 12, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/how-chinas-crackdown-on-
lawyers-affects-media-freedom/ (“A central focus of the accusations made against the human 
rights lawyers has been their use of social media and other online tools to challenge official 
versions of events, share images of small-scale protests that then garner wider attention, raise 
funds from the public, or build popular support for their clients in an effort to gain judicial 
sympathy.”). 
76 . See Javier C. Hernandez, China Frees Wang Yu, Human Rights Lawyer, After 
Videotaped Confession, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/02/
world/asia/human-rights-lawyer-is-released-in-china-after-videotaped-confession.html. 
77. See generally Safeguard Defenders, supra note 72. 
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press78—including Hong Kong’s English language paper, the South 
China Morning Post79—as a means of challenging allegations of rights 
violations.80 
This demonstrates a concerted effort to move the battleground 
away from the intricacies of the legal system and move it into the public 
opinion sphere. Broadcasting confessions of human rights activists, 
prominent journalists, 81  media influencers, and foreigners 82  serve 
several purposes. These confessions, filled with the language of self-
criticism, demonstrate the government’s power over individuals, and 
push the message that rights activism threatens national security and 
state stability. 83  Using a propaganda machine that is able to reach 
hundreds of millions of people, televised confessions also serve to 
associate human rights activism with criminality and illegal activities.84 
Just as rights lawyers and activists successfully used traditional 
and social media platforms to highlight cases and specific causes, 
Chinese authorities now use the same platforms to broadcast a different 
message. Yet this is not a battle on an equal playing field. Resources 
 
78. Verna Yu & Danny Lee, Published ‘confessions’ stoke fair trial fears for lawyers held 
in Chinese crackdown, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (last updated Aug. 4, 2016, 10:47 AMJ), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1841387/published-confessions-
stoke-fair-trial-fears-lawyers [https://perma.cc/YC3A-MW8W]. 
79. The South China Morning Post faced harsh criticism for breaking the story of Zhao 
Wei’s confession under suspicious circumstances; journalists and China experts questioned the 
veracity of the story, noting that there was no by-line and Zhao Wei had not reached out to her 
family at the time of the interview. See Young Chinese legal activist ‘regrets’ civil rights 
activism, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (July 11, 2016, 11:31 PM), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1988501/young-chinese-legal-
activist-regrets-civil-rights [https://perma.cc/F2FV-WNGR]; cf. David Bandurski, The Mea 
Culpa Machine: Is the South China Morning Post pushing Chinese political ‘confessions’?, H. 
K. FREE PRESS (July 16, 2016, 6:29 PM), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/07/16/the-mea-
culpa-machine-is-the-south-china-morning-post-pushing-chinese-political-confessions/ 
[https://perma.cc/8Z62-VJWP]. 
80. See, e.g., Tom Phillips, Bookseller Gui Minhai surfaces in Chinese custody to deliver 
staged confession, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2018, 9:26 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2018/feb/10/bookseller-gui-minhai-surfaces-in-chinese-custody-to-deliver-staged-
confession [https://perma.cc/YPH5-HKM8] (describing Gui Minhai’s interview with the press).  
81. See Patrick Boehler, Beijing detains, parades journalist Gao Yu on state TV for 
‘leaking state secrets,’ SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May 8, 2014, 4:55 PM), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china-insider/article/1507195/beijing-detains-parades-journalist-
gao-yu-state-tv-leaking-state [https://perma.cc/P8ZX-5KXT]. 
82. See Edward Wong, China Uses Foreigners’ Televised Confessions to Serve Its Own 
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are now poured into soft power tools to promote positive views about 
China with investments by government media but also other 
mainstream and digital media outlets, with the goal of presenting an 
alternative vision of news reporting that is less in the service of the 
citizen, and more in the service of the state. This coordinated campaign 
to project positive stories of China includes the creation of a new 
broadcast agency “Voice of China” which consolidates state run media 
outlets like China Central Television, China Global Television 
Network, China National Radio, and China Radio International, and 
which will report directly to the Party’s publicity department.85 The 
recent decision to dissolve the State Administration of Press, 
Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (“SAPPRFT”) and 
consolidate regulatory power over news, online content, and film under 
the Communist Party publicity department86 also indicates a shift in the 
propaganda campaign. It “signals tighter media control amid a broad 
crackdown on news, online content and film that goes against Party 
values under President Xi Jinping.”87 
Similarly, reforms in 2017 and 2018 further centralized the 
regulatory landscape for social media and Internet platforms, including 
increasing the resources available to strengthen the censorship 
infrastructure through a central government agency. 88  Changes in 
regulations and increased censorship strengthened the Great Firewall, 
especially through significant limitations on the use of virtual private 
networks (“VPN”) software that allow users to access blocked 
information.89 As part of Xi Jinping’s “cyber sovereignty” campaign, 
government regulators required state-run telecommunications firms to 
 
85 . See Pei Li & Christian Shepherd, China tightens grip on media with regulator 





88 . According to reports, the State Computer Network and Information Security 
Management Centre (which runs the Great Firewall) is now under the central commission on 
internet security headed by Xi Jinping. See Zhou Xin, It’s the mysterious department behind 
China’s growing influence across the globe. And it’s getting bigger, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST (Mar. 21, 2018, 4:37 PM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-
politics/article/2138196/its-mysterious-department-behind-chinas-growing 
[https://perma.cc/9KTN-DFNK]. 
89 . See, e.g., Lucy Hornby, China’s VPN crackdown is about money as much as 
censorship, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/35eafc9a-fcf8-11e7-9b32-
d7d59aace167 [https://perma.cc/XXA3-BF8X]. 
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use technology to block VPNs and other circumvention tools.90 The 
stakes for challenging dominant state narratives increased—regulations 
from the Cyberspace Administration of China released in 2017 now 
impose real name registration requirements for users seeking to post 
online content or comments, and legal liability for Internet platform 
providers who fail to regulate online content.91 
IV. INNOVATION AND MARGINALIZATION: LGBTQ RIGHTS 
AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS RE-EXAMINED 
The intentional marginalization of rights-focused advocacy by 
Chinese authorities and the re-assertion of Party leadership over all 
aspects of life, including within the courts, mean that previous political 
calculations about rights lawyering and activism must be re-examined. 
Although Fu and Cullen noted that “an authoritarian state embraces 
weiquan lawyering when it takes on issues that do not threaten the 
state’s legitimacy,” 92 it is no longer clear what issues do not pose 
threats. We are now at an inflection point—how can right lawyers and 
activists best navigate the shifting political lines that determine the 
acceptability of (1) what advocacy issues activists can work on; (2) how 
they can advocate; and even (3) whom is allowed to speak? 
This Section considers how issues like LGBTQ rights and 
women’s rights, which were previously perceived as politically 
acceptable, are now in an uneasy status vis-à-vis the state. Women’s 
rights and LGBTQ rights lawyering offer useful sites of inquiry and 
comparison for several reasons. First, LGBTQ issues are intrinsically 
connected to issues related to gender and sexuality. Traditional gender 
stereotypes serve as impediments both to gender equality as well as 
LGBTQ equality because discrimination against individuals on 
account of gender roles or for perceived violations of gender norms.93 
 
90. See China Tells Carriers to Block Access to Personal VPNs by February, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS (July 10, 2017, 10:50 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-10/china-
is-said-to-order-carriers-to-bar-personal-vpns-by-february [https://perma.cc/FQY8-NYTY]. 
91. See 国家互联网信息办公室公布《互联网跟帖评论服务管理规定》[The State 
Internet Information Office Promulgates the “Administrative Regulations on Internet Comments 
Comments Service”], 国家互联网信息办公 [CYBERSPACE ADMINISTRATION OF CHINA] (Aug. 
25, 2017, 11:45 AM), http://www.cac.gov.cn/2017-08/25/c_1121541481.htm 
[https://perma.cc/NGE4-KU9W]. 
92. Fu & Cullen, supra note 22, at 126. 
93. See John Balzano, Toward a Gay-Friendly China?: Legal Implications of Transition 
for Gays and Lesbians, 16 L. & SEXUALITY 1, 15 (2007) (explaining the relationship between 
gender law and LGBTQ issues). 
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Second, though their treatment under the Chinese legal system and 
within the Chinese government agencies are markedly different, 
activism and lawyering in furtherance of both rights issues used similar 
tools with comparable effect. Third, both women’s rights and LGBTQ 
rights issues were previously defined as “social issues” that are less 
politically sensitive, albeit for different reasons, but recent experiences 
demonstrate that the landscape shifted, and therefore is worth re-
examining. 
A. Innovation in Legal Grey Areas 
As noted above, the mark of political acceptability is one that 
allows rights lawyers and activists a modicum of political cover for 
their actions. In the case of women’s rights and LGBTQ rights, it is a 
double-edged sword. Cast as social issues, they are not typically seen 
as core rights like civil and political rights (including freedom of speech 
and freedom of religion) and so have not always been taken up by high-
profile rights lawyers. Yet, this also means that issues associated with 
gender and sexuality were not always readily attacked. For LGBTQ 
rights activists, invisibility is a major impediment—both in terms of 
invisibility within government policies and data, and invisibility within 
Chinese society.94 Yet, this invisibility may also be protective: activists 
posited that LGBTQ rights mobilization is not “intimidating” to the 
government because “the population is perceived to be so small in 
China.”95 
Women’s rights were traditionally perceived as politically 
safe 96 —legal and policy advocacy on women’s rights issues like 
domestic violence, and even the land rights of rural women, has mostly 
been allowed to proceed unimpeded by the Chinese authorities. Not 
only does the government hold up gender equality as a central tenet of 
 
94. See Joy L. Chia. LGBTQ Rights in China: Movement-Building in Uncertain Times, in 
HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA (Biddulph & Rosenzweig eds., 2018) (forthcoming) 
(on file with author). 
95. See Timothy Hildebrandt, Same Sex Marriage in China? The strategic promulgation 
of a progressive policy and its impact on LGBT activism, 37 REV. OF INT’L STUD. 1313, 1322 
(2011) (reporting that “a prominent gay leader reported that when gays and lesbians talk about 
human rights the government does not see it as sensitive because the population is perceived to 
be so small in China” and “the effect of this group mobilization is not as intimidating to the 
government.”). 
96. See Fu & Cullen, supra note 22, at 126 (noting that women’s rights were not politically 
problematic at the time of writing). 
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its political ideology,97 it has also passed many laws that seek to protect 
women’s rights. Most feminist activists believed that working on issues 
that reflected the daily lives of many women and which had widespread 
public support (for example, employment discrimination, sexual 
harassment on public transportation, discrimination in university 
admissions), would accord them some semblance of safety and allow 
them to avoid government attention and backlash.98 
Chinese courts prove to be relatively welcoming to cases seeking 
to protect women and LGBTQ people from discrimination, perhaps due 
to the perception that anti-discrimination cases are not politically 
sensitive. Since 2013, several cases challenging gender-discriminatory 
practices have successfully been brought to court, including China’s 
first successful gender discrimination case finding that a Hangzhou city 
cooking school violated the plaintiffs’ right to equal employment by 
denying her application on account of her gender.99 A previous case 
against a Beijing education institute for refusing to consider a female 
college graduate for an administrative assistant job that was advertised 
as seeking only male applicants was settled in 2013 for 30,000 yuan.100 
In 2015, similar cases were successfully brought against the Beijing 
Postal Service (the first such case against a state-owned enterprise) for 
the denial of an application because the headquarters did not wish to 
hire women as frontline postal workers,101 and against the blatantly 
 
97. See Joy L. Chia, Legislating Inequalities: Gender, Sexuality and Violence in China, in 
GENDER, VIOLENCE AND THE STATE IN ASIA (Amy Barrow & Joy L. Chia eds., 2016). 
98. Author’s Notes (Feb. 2015 Interview with feminist activists). See Rachel E. Stern & 
Kevin J. O’Brien, “Politics at the Boundary: Mixed Signals and the Chinese State,” Modern 
China (Vol. 38), 174-98 (2012) for an important discussion about how people advocating for 
change calculate which issues are safer than others to work on, including using government 
interest in their favor.  
99. See 就业性别歧视第一案胜诉！ [The First Case of Employment Discrimination in 
Sex Won!], NGOCN (Nov. 11, 2014, 4:39 PM), http://www.ngocn.net/news/360312.html 
[https://perma.cc/6R8K-ZFW5]; Fan Yiying, China Lacks Anti-Discrimination Law with Teeth, 
SIXTH TONE (Jan. 6, 2017), http://www.sixthtone.com/news/1772/china-lacks-anti-
discrimination-law-with-teeth [https://perma.cc/WTL9-WEGK] (providing detailed analysis of 
Chinese anti-discrimination law). 
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sexist recruitment policies of restaurant refusing to hire women as 
chefs.102 
Rights lawyering on LGBTQ issues also increased since 2014, 
when Chinese courts accepted the country’s first LGBTQ rights-
specific case. This high profile lawsuit challenged the widespread use 
of “treatments” claiming to “cure” homosexuality—in its judgment, the 
Beijing court stated that homosexuality is not a disease and therefore 
did not need to be treated.103 In 2016, China’s first same-sex marriage 
lawsuit was brought in Changsha, Henan Province; although it was 
ultimately unsuccessful, it was remarkable that the case was brought 
and then accepted by the court in the first place.104 In 2017, China’s 
first successful case against involuntary hospitalization to undergo 
conversion therapy was won, with the Henan court ruling that the gay 
man was held against his will and subjected to regular physical abuse 
and forced treatment.105 In December 2016, Mr. C., a transgender man, 
won China’s first transgender employment discrimination case after a 
Guizhou court ruled he was illegally fired.106 
B. Marginalization in Shifting Landscapes 
Yet, winning in the courts did not necessarily indicate that issues 
were politically safe. In one fell swoop, assumptions about the non-
sensitivity of issues as anodyne as sexual harassment were proven 
wrong on March 6, 2015, when feminist activists were detained two 
days before International Women’s Day. Public security officers in at 
least three different cities detained more than a dozen young activists 
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in a coordinated crackdown, apparently motivated by an effort to stop 
their planned peaceful activities on sexual harassment on public 
transportation. Although most were released after several hours of 
questioning, the authorities declined to release five young feminists 
(now known as the “Feminist Five”) and subjected them to tough 
interrogation and harsh treatment.107 Though they were released after 
37 days, in great part due to high-profile domestic and international 
campaigns, 108  the chilling effect of the arrests on the feminist 
movement was undeniable. Authorities have drawn a clear line 
between working with women as a population and working on the 
human rights of women.  
For LGBTQ activism, the threats have been less overt, but the 
consequences of government scrutiny are similar. 109  For example, 
domestic NGO regulations do not allow organizations working 
explicitly on LGBTQ rights to register with the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, thereby “restrict[ing] the operational capacity of these groups 
to raise funds, attract human resources, and provide critical legal, 
psychological, and other services.”110 The passage of the Foreign NGO 
Management Law has also impacted LGBTQ groups 
disproportionately—for many LGBTQ activists, international funding 
is “the lifeblood of their organizations” 111  and foreign funding 
restrictions (based on source of funding and intended beneficiaries) 
have diverted resources away from LGBTQ rights.112 
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The tightening of the media landscape since 2016 also greatly 
affected the space for discourse on women’s rights and LGBTQ rights 
activism. New regulations released by the Cyberspace Administration 
of China in May 2017 increased restrictions on acceptable content on 
mass communication and social media platforms, and subjected all 
services offered by online news portals and network providers to party-
sanctioned editorial staff.113 In June 2017, regulations released by the 
China Netcasting Services Association lumped homosexuality together 
with sexual abuse and violence under the category of “abnormal sexual 
relationships,” and banned all references to homosexuality from online 
broadcasting.114 These changes sparked outrage within the LGBTQ 
community with an outpouring of online criticisms; the government 
responded by deleting such criticisms with further penalties: in the case 
of Li Yinhe, China’s leading sexologist, her critical commentary 
resulted in a three-month ban on Weibo.115 
Though discussion of women’s rights issues is generally allowed 
by media censors, influential feminist alternative media accounts have 
been subject to government censorship and attack. In February 2017, 
the social media account of a leading feminist organization, Feminist 
Voices, was suspended for 30 days.116 On March 8, 2018, International 
Women’s Day, the account was shut down indefinitely, with its Weibo 
and WeChat public accounts (and their archives) deleted.117 Feminist 
Voices had more than 180,000 followers on Weibo and was very 
influential among young activist women.118 The silencing of Feminist 
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Voices mark a new phase of ideological control, demonstrating a shift 
in government attitudes (which previously never marked women’s 
rights and gender equality as taboo issues119) to one where feminist 
speech and organizing is deemed politically troublesome. 
V. CONCLUSION: INNOVATION IN THE MIDST OF 
MARGINALIZATION 
Xi Jinping’s vision of a rejuvenated China is one that is 
characterized by increasing authority in the international sphere (driven 
by economic power and a muscular militarism), and a prosperous, well-
regulated Chinese society under the CCP’s authoritative leadership. 
Having presented its economic miracle as a model for developing 
countries, China is now poised to export its governing model, including 
the state-sponsored tools of social control, while the PRC government 
promotes alternative interpretations of international laws—including 
international human rights concepts and international norms of 
engagement. China’s assertiveness in the international sphere is 
matched by the Chinese authorities’ intolerance of those that disrupt 
the singular mythology of Chinese ascendancy. 
The government’s reaction to independent, vocal, and well-
organized activists working to expand Chinese society’s ideas of 
gender equality and LGBTQ rights likely signals a wariness of the 
mobilization power of these two groups; and perhaps a recognition that 
such activism at their very core do fundamentally challenge the status 
quo. Rights lawyers and advocates working on gender and sexuality are 
presented with a conundrum: how to harness social perceptions that 
women’s rights and LGBTQ rights are politically non-threatening to 
their advantage. As the public space for discourse around the content 
of “human rights” and “universal values” constricts, the question for 
rights lawyers and activists is one of communications: how to 
deconstruct human rights concepts into their most basic ideas with 
broad public appeal—to learn how to communicate about ideas of 
justice, equality, and dignity in ways that the general public 
understands and supports. 
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